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Abstract 
Software Process Improvement projects face a double challenge: On the one hand are these projects 
often major organizational change projects requiring considerable investments in terms of time and 
money. The group charged with conducting an SPI project has, on the other hand, little formal 
authority to influence or force software professionals to engage in SPI work and define and implement 
changes. In this research in progress paper, we present first results from our analysis of how an SPI 
group can use alliances to obtain influence and induce change. Our analysis shows that the concept of 
alliances is useful both to understand organizational influence and to provide practical advice for 
practitioners involved in organizational processes such as SPI. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s many software development organizations have turned to Software Process 
Improvement (SPI) as a means to improve the predictability, quality and productivity of their software 
processes (Aaen & Arent & Mathiassen & Ngwenyama 2001, Mathiassen & Pries-Heje & 
Ngwenyama 2001, Herbsleb & Zubrow & Goldenson & Hayes & Paulk 1997, Paulk & Curtis & 
Chrissis 1995). An SPI approach involves deliberate, planned, and ongoing changes to all parts of a 
software organization: day-to-day and long term planning and management, the organization of 
projects, the processes used in software development, and the tools needed to support software 
development and management. Successful SPI can produce several benefits for a software 
development organization, but it is also is a very complex and time-consuming organizational change 
process (Herbsleb et. al. 1997, Mathiassen et. al. 2001). A survey of SPI projects has shown that 
implementation of stable project management practices takes 18-24 months, and getting from there to 
shared organizational software development process standards another 12-18 months (Herbsleb et. al. 
1997). Studies have also shown a considerable failure rate for SPI projects (Ngwenyama & Nielsen 
2003). 
Experience from SPI projects underline the importance of high and sustained commitment from all 
levels of management as well as the software developers. Organizational politics, turf guarding, and 
cynicism towards change processes are, on the other hand, considered the most important threats to 
SPI (Herbsleb et. al. 1997). It is, however, less clear how an organization undertaking SPI can secure 
and maintain the necessary support from all stakeholders, and how it can identify and overcome the 
potential threats. 
The SPI literature generally recommends that responsibility for planning and conducting SPI be 
organized around a separate organizational entity such as a dedicated SPI group or department (c.f. 
McFeeley 1996). The group’s responsibilities include: production and dissemination – including 
training – of software development process descriptions, implementation of development and 
management tools, and establishment of procedures for collection and use of process and product 
metrics. The group is, however, not part of the management hierarchy and has no direct or formal way 
to make changes happen; nor does it control critical organizational resources such as, time, personnel 
or careers. The SPI group is therefore without the means normally associated with organizational 
power and influence (Porter, Angle and Allen 2003a). The formation and staffing of an SPI group does 
signal management’s interest in SPI and consequently lends some authority to the group, but initial 
resource allocation is not the same as sustained and, more importantly, continued management 
commitment and support to a long term effort such as SPI (Abrahamsson 2001). Furthermore, 
important stakeholders, e.g., software professionals and project managers may support or resist SPI for 
reasons of their own (Abrahamsson 2001, Nielsen & Nørbjerg 2001). 
The challenge for the SPI group is therefore how it can influence other members of an organization to 
support the SPI effort by e.g.; following new management and development processes, implementing 
quality assurance measures etc. In the research presented here, we use the concept of alliances (Cohen 
& Bradford 2003) to analyze how an SPI group manages to influence key organizational members to 
support and further the SPI project. The research is based on data collected during three years of action 
research in SPI projects in two different organizations. For reasons of space limitations this paper only 
discusses findings from one of the organizations. 
Our research contributes to SPI practice and research as well as to organizational research more 
generally. First, there is a need, as discussed above, to learn about the factors contributing to SPI 
success (or failure) as well as practical advice for SPI professionals. Second, research on 
organizational power and influence processes has been mainly concerned with vertical (i.e. up and 
down the formal hierarchy) influence processes, largely ignoring the way groups or individuals 
influence others laterally. There is, however, increased recognition of the need to understand lateral 
influence processes as organizations change towards flatter hierarchies and a more networked structure 
(Porter et. al. 2003b). A study of alliances in SPI; how they are formed, sustained and (perhaps) 
dissolve, is a valuable contribution in these regards. 
In the next section we briefly discuss organizational influence and power, and we examine the concept 
of alliances as a way to obtain organizational influence. Section 3 describes the research setting and 
approach and section 4 gives a short overview of the SPI project under study. Section 5 analyses how 
the SPI group on the one hand managed to build and use alliances to reach its ends and on the other 
how – as events unfolded – alliances were eventually dismantled. Section 6 discusses the findings and 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
2 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCE AND ALLIANCES 
It is not simple to define organizational power, let alone determine how it is obtained and used to 
influence others (Salancik & Pfeffer 2003). In their collection of theoretical and empirical studies of 
organizational power and influence processes Porter et. al. portray power as a resource, “a reservoir of 
force” that a person can use to change the behavior of another (2003a, p. 3). In line with the strategic 
consistency theory of power (Hickson & Hinings & Lee & Schneck & Pennings 2003) they go on to 
relate power closely to control over and dependence on resources: If a person, B, depends (in some 
sense) on A, then A is in a position to exert influence over B. Key to this is A’s control over resources 
that B needs and cannot – or only with considerable difficulty – get access to without A’s consent 
(Porter et. al. 2003a). Note that resources are understood broadly to include visible resources such as a 
job, money, promotion or time, and less tangible such as advise, knowledge or appreciation. Thus, 
organizational power is not linked to formal management hierarchies but can be based on; e.g. (expert) 
knowledge, pivotal roles in organizational processes or prestige (Porter et. al. 2003a, Salancik et. al. 
2003). 
Above, power and influence is seen as a one-way process; i.e. a person with access to resources can 
influence another person (or group) to do something. But how can a person that does not have that 
control over resources make change happen, especially when the persons (or groups) whose effort is 
needed are busy or do not agree with the need for change? In such cases Cohen & Bradford (2003) 
propose to see influence not as a one-way but mutually beneficial alliance between organizational 
members. Alliances depend on the idea of reciprocity; i.e. that organizational transactions are built 
upon the exchange of something for something else. The alliance partners must therefore agree on the 
“goods” or “currencies” to exchange and their value for each. Currency must be understood in broad 
terms to include more than material goods or tangible resources. Examples of currencies are being 
allowed to excel in what one knows well, appreciation, time and effort, increased visibility, 
information, friendship, and inclusion in networks. Building and sustaining alliances require mutual 
recognition and understanding and – not the least – that the party wanting to build an alliance is able to 
build trust with the potential ally. 
A newly formed SPI group does not have immediate access to the resources usually related to power. 
The group has no managerial authority over the software developers and managers whose help they 
need to identify software process problems, find solutions and – usually the most difficult task – 
change the way software projects are conducted and managed. The members of the group may be 
experts in software engineering and software project management but such knowledge is not 
necessarily scarce among software professionals and/or those professionals may believe themselves to 
be (at least) as knowledgeable in matters of software development, as the members of the SPI group. 
Furthermore, the software professionals may not be convinced that the benefits of SPI; i.e. better 
process control, and higher productivity and quality, are worth their investment in effort and time, or 
they may fundamentally disagree with the assumptions and goals of the SPI project (Nielsen et. al. 
2001). In this situation, as discussed above, alliance building may be a fruitful way for the SPI group 
to gain influence. 
This raises the following questions with respect to SPI projects: 
• Who are the potential allies? 
• What does the SPI group need from these allies? 
• What can the SPI group offer in exchange? 
• How can the SPI group initiate an alliance? 
• How are alliances sustained? 
• What causes alliances to fail or fall apart? 
Cohen and Bradford (2003) do not describe the processes of forming and dissolving alliances. In the 
following we will, however, use the concept of alliances, understood as mutually beneficial exchange 
of “currencies” between organizational members or groups, to analyze data collected during a 
longitudinal action research project in a Danish software development organization. The analysis and 
subsequent discussion serves as (1) a first answer to the questions raised above; (2) exploration of the 
usefulness of the alliance concept in understanding and guiding SPI projects. The results further serve 
as a basis for further exploration of lateral influence processes in organizations. 
3 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD  
This research is based on an action research project in a Danish software organization. The research 
project followed the guidelines for Collaborative Practice Research (Mathiassen 2002). The project 
took place in the period 1997-1999 during which one of the authors participated in the organization’s 
SPI activities together with other researchers, external consultants and SPI professionals from the 
company. The researchers and consultants participated in regular meetings in the SPI group and 
worked with software developers and project managers engaged in specific improvement initiatives. 
The research was documented through tape-recordings of meetings, meeting minutes, taped interviews 
with key stakeholders, diaries, e-mails, field notes and internal material from the company. 
For the present research, e-mails, minutes, interview transcripts, field-notes and diaries produced 
during the three-year period have been analyzed by one of the authors. The coding has been based on 
Cohen and Bradford’s (2003) idea of alliances and aimed to answer questions such as: What alliances 
were formed? How did the SPI group identify potential allies? What currencies were used to establish 
and sustain alliances and what caused alliances to break down? 
The first analysis was documented as an extended narrative, which was discussed among the authors. 
The present paper presents a condensed version of the narrative and a first discussion of the findings. 
4 THE SPI PROJECT AT B&K 
B&K develops leading edge measurement instruments and systems. A typical product consists of a 
measuring device sometimes with embedded software, connected to a handheld or desktop computer 
with analysis and presentation software. Development projects usually have both hardware and a 
software part, but they are run as integrated projects under one project manager. The SPI project at 
B&K was only concerned with software development projects. 
During the SPI project there were around 7-10 active development projects at any one time, typically 
running 6-18 months each with 5-10 software developers. A technical director headed the 
development department. A new director had been appointed shortly before commencement of the SPI 
project. He was replaced about half way through the project. 
The SPI group consisted of external researchers and consultants, and one full time and 2-3 part-time 
software professionals and project managers from B&K. The researchers and consultants spent 1-2 
days/month at B&K and participated in information gathering, workshops and training sessions, and 
took active part as coaches and consultants in specific improvement activities. 
The project resulted in both successful and failed software process improvement initiatives. The 
following description of the project divides it roughly into three main phases, identified by the main 
focus of the project: 
• Identification of improvements: January – October 1997 
• Improvement initiatives: November 1997 – mid 1999 
• Re-assessment and planning of new improvements (mid to end 1999) 
4.1 Identification of improvements 
The SPI group used the first meetings to get acquainted and to search for an approach to the SPI 
project. B&K’s own SPI professionals suggested to link improvement initiatives to ongoing projects, 
so that new (improved) software processes could grow from practice, rather than be written directly 
into the quality system. The approach was generally accepted as the best way to ensure acceptance 
among the three important groups of stakeholders: developers, project managers and top management. 
To implement this approach the SPI group needed precise knowledge of the character of current 
processes and potential improvement areas. The SPI group therefore decided to launch a series of 
interviews with project managers to identify problems and collect suggestions for solutions. The group 
conducted 7 interviews with project managers over a 3-month period. The interviews focused on 
present practices, software process problems identified by the project manager, and the project 
manager’s suggestions on how to solve the problems (Iversen & Nielsen & Nørbjerg 1999). 
The interview series resulted in a report summarizing the SPI group’s interpretation of B&K’s process 
problems and a list of suggested improvements; e.g. an iterative software process model, requirements 
specification, or reuse. The report was presented to the project managers and top management at a 
workshop in October 1997. At the end of the workshop, the project managers chose which 
improvement they would work with in their current or coming projects. 
4.2 Improvement initiatives 
The improvement initiatives resulting from the workshop ran from December 1997 through the first 4 
months of 1999. Experiences from successful initiatives were summarized in reports and the new 
processes spread through 'word-of-mouth' and by inclusion into the quality system. 
Four improvement projects were launched: 
• Iterative development process (December 1997 - March 1999) 
• Requirements specification (second quarter 1998 - February 1999) 
• Reuse (November December 1998; failed) 
• Project tracking (November 1997 - second quarter 1998, failed) 
Each of these initiatives was associated with one or more development projects. Members of the SPI 
formed a support group for the development projects involved in improvement initiatives.  
The support group met regularly with the development group to coach them in usable processes, 
techniques, and tools, and to collect information about the projects' progress and the experience with 
the new processes. Suggestions for changes to practice or for adjusting the process description as and 
when needed were also made by the support group. The resulting processes were ultimately described 
and included in B&K's quality system. 
4.3 Re-assessment and planning new improvements 
With the conclusion of ongoing improvement projects it was time to take stock and plan future 
activities. A Bootstrap assessment (with outside assessors) confirmed that improvements had been 
made in some areas but also pointed to new or so far unaddressed problems. The approach used 
previously (work with individual development projects) was tried once more but without much 
success. The SPI group realized that it did not quite know how to proceed and decided to make a 
second round of interviews with both project managers and top management to get an evaluation of 
the SPI project and ideas for future activities. During and after the interview series the SPI group 
attempted to involve top management in the planning of future SPI initiatives but was unsuccessful. 
With key SPI persons leaving B&K and dwindling support from top management, the end of 1999 
effectively terminated B&K’s SPI project. 
5 CREATING, MAINTAINING AND LOOSING ALLIANCES AT B&K 
The organizational model of SPI at B&K anchored the improvement initiatives in development 
projects. Members of the SPI group helped pilot project teams define and apply new processes. The 
experiences gained in the pilot projects were used to define organization wide processes that were 
distributed via B&K’s intranet. 
The SPI group identified top management, project managers and project teams as the most important 
allies. In the course of the project the group managed to form working alliances with project managers 
and team members. The relationship with top management was, on the other hand, never very 
successful. 
The following analysis focuses on the building of alliances with project managers and teams, and the 
less successful alliances with top management. The analysis will concentrate on the currencies used 
and the outcome of the alliances 
5.1 Committing project managers: obtaining knowledge 
B&K’s project managers were a powerful group whose support was crucial for the success of the SPI 
project. The SPI group therefore quickly decided to focus its attention on project managers and 
software developers while in practice downplaying the relations with upper management.  
At the outset B&K’s project managers were skeptical towards SPI, and they were not ready to adopt 
new processes for which they saw no immediate use. The SPI group was convinced, however, that 
there were a number of problems with B&K’s software processes such as delays, faulty products, and 
poor planning and oversight of projects. To the project managers, on the other hand, were these 
problems largely caused by unrealistic expectations from the sales and marketing departments and 
overly bureaucratic planning processes (Nielsen et. al. 2001). Thus, they did not necessarily see a need 
to change their own practices. 
Furthermore, engaging in improvement initiatives is not without costs and risks for the projects: There 
is an up front investment in time needed to learn and adapt new processes and techniques and there is 
always a risk that the new practices are no better, or even worse, than the old.  
The SPI group therefore had to convince the project managers, both that there was room for 
improvements in development projects, and that collaboration with the SPI group would support these 
improvements. The SPI group soon realized that this would require detailed knowledge about B&K’s 
software development practices and problems. 
The main currency used by the SPI group in its approach to the project managers were: knowledge of 
software process improvement as well as of specific software processes and techniques that could be 
useful for the project managers. The project managers, on the other hand, would have to allocate time 
to SPI activities in exchange. The challenge for the SPI group was to make its software process 
knowledge useful for the potential partners; i.e. to convince project managers that spending time with 
the SPI group would give them useful knowledge. 
The series of project manager interviews helped the SPI group build its assets in terms of knowledge 
about B&K’s software processes and the project managers’ own improvement ideas and suggestions. 
When the SPI group presented the results of the interviews, it was clear that the project managers 
accepted the interpretation of their process problems and suggestions for improvements (Iversen et. al. 
1999). 
5.2 Working with teams: trading knowledge and time 
Improvement initiatives were anchored in ongoing development projects as described above. A project 
group would apply a new or changed process and the SPI group would help fine-tune the process and 
collect the project group’s experiences. The end result would be a tested and verified software process 
ready to disseminate to the rest of the organization. 
Looked at as an alliance, this process can be described as follows: the SPI group trains or otherwise 
supplies knowledge of useful processes to the project group. The project group uses the processes in 
its daily practices and gives the SPI group access to its experiences, which the SPI group systematizes 
and disseminates to the rest of the organization. The currencies used in the exchange are knowledge 
and training from the SPI group, and time from the project group 
This produces some challenges for the SPI group wanting to form the alliance: The project managers 
had – as explained above – accepted the SPI group’s suggestions for improvements, and they had all 
committed to participate in at least one improvement initiative. But the commitment was informal and 
the project managers were able to back out of the improvement initiative at any time without any 
sanctions. All the SPI group had to offer in the alliance was knowledge that might or might not be 
useful for the project group. The project group had to invest time, both to learn and adapt the new 
processes, and to provide feed-back to the SPI group without knowing if the new processes were better 
than the old, thus running the risk of project delays and/or decreased product quality. The SPI group 
did not, however, have the authority required to guarantee the projects the resources or “slack” they 
needed on this account.  
The SPI group was able to strengthen its position in some cases. In the area of requirements 
engineering, for example, previous improvement initiatives in B&K had already demonstrated the 
usefulness of a number of specific techniques, and other project managers wanted to learn about these. 
The SPI group could, therefore, offer training in return for the projects’ time and effort. 
In other cases it was less obvious what the SPI group had to offer in return for the project team’s time 
and effort. In the case of development process models, for example, it was clear that an iterative 
development process would fit B&K’s needs better than the current waterfall process. It was less 
obvious, however, exactly what kind of iterative process would work. All the SPI group had to offer, 
therefore, was a general overview of iterative approaches to software development, not a ready-to-use 
process or set of techniques. It was up to the development project – assisted by the SPI group – to 
adapt the general iterative approaches to its own needs. The SPI group – on the other hand – needed 
frequent access to the project group in order to learn about the group’s experiences with the iterative 
processes. 
Not surprisingly, the project team working with the new development process questioned this 
arrangement in various ways. At the initial meeting with the SPI group, project team members wanted 
confirmation that the new processes would be better than the old. During subsequent meetings they 
would frequently ask for very detailed advice on a number of problems, ranging from specific 
planning and follow-up techniques to user interface and design architecture. The members of the 
support group felt that the developers wanted them to be consultants and teachers on topics unrelated 
to the improvement initiative. They were, therefore, not immediately prepared to meet all the 
developers’ requests, leading to a series of crises in the collaboration. 
When viewed from the perspective of alliance formation, this is an example shows how the SPI group 
and the project team members did not agree on the currencies to be exchanged in the alliance. In 
exchange for its time and effort, the project team wanted knowledge and training beyond what the 
support group was prepared to offer. The turning point came when the support group was able to use 
the meetings with the project group for a combination of coaching and experience gathering. In these 
meetings, the developers informed the SPI group about their progress and experiences with the 
iterative development process, while the SPI group gave feed-back and advice on how to solve 
specific problems and avoid potential pitfalls. Thus the two groups managed to reach an agreement on 
what to exchange in the alliance. 
5.3  (Not) dealing with management 
Management support for SPI projects is obviously important because management grants the SPI 
project the resources and ‘rights’ to work with the organization’s software processes. From a 
management perspective, SPI is a long-term investment in improving productivity, predictability and 
product quality that often delivers no immediate results. 
Although the newly appointed technical director of B&K stated that ‘SPI was already on his table’ 
[Interview with technical director 1999] when he assumed his position, it was never high on his list of 
priorities. The SPI group experienced his lack of interest in several ways: First, he allocated relatively 
few resources to the SPI project. Second, it was difficult to get a clear statement of his vision and 
purpose for the SPI project. Finally he would not explicitly allocate time to improvement initiatives 
within projects. 
The SPI group had few assets in its dealing with the technical director. A potential asset of course, is a 
project plan and the following status reports that can help convince management that something is 
going on. The group discussed such plans during its first meetings, but when the interview series with 
project managers began, the SPI group more or less ceased to think about top management and 
concentrated on the interviews. The SPI group later learned that this was a nearly fatal decision. The 
technical director began to see the interviews conducted by the SPI group as merely ‘studying the fish 
in the aquarium’ [Interview with technical director 1999], making no real progress in any useful 
direction. He seriously considered closing down the SPI project. However, the SPI group misread the 
director, thinking that management was willing to leave SPI alone – if not actively support it. 
However, it was an SPI workshop that partly changed the technical director’s opinion. During the 
workshop he was able to see purpose and direction in the SPI group’s work. But this did not result in 
more interaction/attention between the SPI group and upper management. 
The appointment of a new technical director in 1998 did not change much from the SPI group’s point 
of view. B&K went through some major organizational changes (and lay-offs) and the SPI group was 
busy with improvement projects. Signals, from ‘above’ were, that the new director found SPI 
important, but attempts to establish closer contact with top management failed and during 1999 the 
SPI group became increasingly frustrated with the lack of management involvement and support. 
Towards the end of the SPI project the new technical director acknowledged that the SPI work had 
produced positive results so far, but he was critical towards what he called the SPI group’s ‘scientific’ 
theoretical approach [Interview with new technical director 1999]; what was needed were practical 
initiatives, tools etc. that would create immediate change based on the practical and immediate needs 
of the projects. He also found that the development organization was capable of defining and 
implementing improvement initiatives without an SPI group, and he proposed to replace a dedicated 
SPI group with interest groups and committees of project managers around different topics. 
5.4 Running out of alliances 
The overall impression from the last part of the project was that the SPI group gradually lost influence 
in B&K, with top management as well as with software developers and project managers. 
Concerning project managers, it appears that the changing nature of improvements required a change 
in alliance forming strategies. The successful initiatives, process models and requirements 
specification were focused on individual projects, but the remaining improvements; e.g. reuse and 
configuration management required coordinated action across projects. Project managers and 
developers would no longer be free to (individually) adapt processes to solve their own problems, but 
would have to coordinate with others; thus incurring higher risks for the individual project with less 
tangible (immediate) benefits. 
With these new and changing conditions the SPI group’s alliances with individual project managers 
which were based on the exchange of the project manager’s time in return of useful knowledge and 
solutions to immediate project specific problems, needed to be reformulated. A new strategy for 
alliances had to be devised to account for the more complex arrangements involving groups of project 
managers. Furthermore, such an arrangement would require more visible management involvement to 
ensure (and possibly enforce) cross-project coordination. The SPI group did not acknowledge this; 
neither did it have an idea of how to approach the problem. 
A possible approach could have been to strengthen the alliance with upper management in order to 
secure support for organizational wide initiatives. But, as discussed above, the SPI group had more or 
less ignored upper management (perhaps) trusting that the results obtained in the collaboration with 
the project managers spoke for themselves. Hence, the new technical management was not prepared to 
continue the support for a dedicated SPI group. 
6 DISCUSSION 
The analysis of B&K’s SPI project gives interesting insights into the dynamics of SPI projects but it 
also points to broader issues and questions regarding the alliance concept itself as a means to study 
and guide organizational influence processes. 
First, the experience from B&K shows us that building and maintaining alliances is an ongoing 
process, which has to be continuously monitored and adjusted. Changes brought about by successful 
SPI alliances, as well as other events, may ultimately undermine the basis of such alliances. Thus, the 
SPI group must be prepared to change the conditions for alliances or to replace alliance partners. 
Identifying the conditions and circumstances leading to (changes in) choice of alliance partners and 
alliance approaches require further studies. 
Second, the case demonstrates the challenges involved in initiating an alliance. The critical point for 
the SPI group in the B&K case was always how to get software developers and project managers 
ready to engage in SPI in the absence of formal management incentives or directives. As a rule, this 
requires that the software professionals are ready to accept an ‘up front’ time and effort investment 
while the SPI group develops the detailed knowledge necessary to be effective. A topic for further 
research is why would software professionals accept these conditions. Is it possible that the “currency” 
during this phase was their wish to excel professionally (Cohen et. al. 2003)? Do they see 
collaboration with the SPI group as one way to gain access to general knowledge about software 
processes that they need? 
Third, and connected to the first point above, the concept of alliances seems to be a useful vehicle for 
understanding the dynamics of SPI processes. As discussed previously, the SPI literature emphasizes 
management commitment as important for SPI success, but our research shows that under certain 
circumstances SPI projects may make progress without such commitment. Our analysis also 
demonstrates the risks involved in such a strategy. This leads to a further research question concerning 
how can SPI groups build and maintain alliances with top management. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have described our research in progress aiming to understand how SPI groups build 
and maintain alliances in order to bring the SPI project forward. Our research so far has convinced us 
that the concept of alliances is a fruitful way to understand lateral influence processes of the type often 
required in SPI projects. We also believe that an improved understanding of alliances, their formation, 
maintenance, and termination can provide useful practical advice for SPI groups.  
Our analysis has provided interesting insights but also raised questions for further research. To answer 
these questions we intend to develop the alliance concept further based on a study of the literature on 
lateral influence processes as well as on empirical analysis of other SPI projects. 
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